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Preface
Access economy, peer economy, collaborative consumption, hippienomics, on
demand economy, collaborative economy, gig economy, people economy,
enabling economy, and empowering economy are some of the synonyms used
for the often mentioned ‘sharing economy’. But, ‘sharing economy’ is
a misnomer, real sharing is one of the most important ingredients in the glue that
holds societies together; hence, sharing has been with us for as long as human
societies have existed. Indeed, we don’t notice how our daily lives are full of
small acts of sharing. In our homes, we share everything with our spouses and
children except the toothbrush and some very personal items. We are also very
generous towards our friends. They can borrow items, such as our tools, car, our
cabin and other items. Then, it is our neighbours that can borrow items that
they may need. Next, we have the constant sharing of roads, busses, schools, hos-
pitals, parks and other public places. In addition, we freely give advice and
inform others (sharing information), without expecting anything in return. In all
these acts of sharing we seldom think about profit. Indeed, it is profit that
changes the act of sharing into an economic exchange, rational and impersonal.
Throughout the ages, items such as rooms, horses, cars, construction equip-
ment, and anything else of significant value were rented out for a price. The
value of the object, the cost of finding a customer, finalising a contract and the
ease of enforcing the said contract, determined the duration of the rental agree-
ment and/or the price of service provided. There was also the critical issue of
trust. In large physical markets, it is difficult to ascertain the trustworthiness of
a stranger that one is entering into an economic transaction with. Only
repeated dealings and proper enquiry can reduce the risk. The costs of all these
activities or the “transaction costs” were high enough to influence the min-
imum rental period or the minimum cost of the services provided.
With the advent of the Internet and advances in communication, location,
payment and Web technologies (Web 2.0), transaction costs were dramatically
reduced, allowing for shorter contract time, and more innovative services.
Many of the transactions are now provided by what is called a digital platform.
Through these platforms, people can book flights, find taxis, book hotels, buy
and sell shares and conduct a myriad of other economic transactions.
These platforms perform three key roles: provide an open, plug-and-play
infrastructure, make available a secure transaction mechanism and provide
a reputation system that many claim solves the problem of screening so that
strangers can comfortably interact with each other. According to Simon (2011,
Kindle Location 773) “the platform is becoming one of the most important
business models of the new millennium – and with good reason. Buoyed by
the success of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, many exciting new com-
panies are hitching their wagons on the platform” (see Figure 0.1).
We can say that the advent of the digital platform made the sharing economy
possible. This is quite evident in the many definitions provided by organiza-
tions and scholars. For example, in their book What’s Mine Is Yours: The Rise of
Collaborative Consumption, Botsman and Rogers (2010, sec. Kindle locations
159–160) mix the traditional sharing with the rental/service platform business
model. They define the collaborative consumption as “traditional sharing,
bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting and swapping, redefined through
technology and peer communities”.
A more precise definition is provided by the Department of Management
and e-Government of the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and
Regional Development (CMD), which defines sharing economy as “Coup-
ling between individuals and/or legal entities through digital platforms that
facilitate the provision of services and/or sharing of assets/property, resources,
expertise or capital without transferring ownership rights” (‘Kartlegging av
delingsøkonomien i Norge’, 2016). In other words, sharing economy is
a digital platform-based business model. These platforms have dramatically
reduced the transaction costs, which in turn have opened the door to a world
of innovations. This paper presents some of these innovations and their effects
on the markets.
Chapter 1 explores the profitability of businesses using digital platforms.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that the scope and size of income gen-
erated via digital platforms remains limited and online income is typically
a supplement rather than the main income source. In addition, the findings
also make a linkage between education, income and social status with the
type of activities pursued on these platforms. For example, while highly edu-
cated persons with high incomes are active on capital platforms like Airbnb,
the low-skilled workers, migrants, unemployed and young people are
attracted to labour platforms such as Uber.
Chapter 2 examines three archetypes of financial sharing economy business
models: the active investment in an idea; the banking clone and the hybrid.
Activities, their linkages and who performs them vary with these archetypes,
while the trustee and trust-facilitating activities also vary among them,
making users, their ideas, or the platform the essential carrier of trust-
establishing activities. The more trust, relying on the user, the more affective
it is and the more limited is the spread of providers. This partially explains
the success and failure of financial sharing economy operations.
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Figure 0.1 Some examples of platform models employed.
Chapter 3 examines the subject of Mobility as a Service (MaaS) as a new
phenomenon of the sharing economy in transport services. The idea revolves
around the meta-platform that integrates different platform solutions, like
taxis, trains, buses, boats, ferries, and bike-sharing, into one platform. In such
a meta-platform or alliance, trust, control and risk reduction are major issues
that are examined and considered.
Chapter 4 looks at the effects of the increasing Airbnb activities on Nor-
wegian house and rental prices. The adverse effects of Airbnb and other
online marketplace and hospitality service brokerages on local rental condi-
tions have been observed in many countries such as Germany, United
Kingdom, Spain and others. This chapter concludes that if Airbnb expands at
even half of its current rate of expansion, in a few years major Norwegian
cities such as Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Tromsø will face a shortage of
rental accommodation for their local populations.
Chapter 5 describes the sharing economy as a distinct type of digital entre-
preneurship and gives first insights into its impact on regional economic
development, which represents a hitherto unexplored topic. Using Airbnb
rental data for the touristic destination of Østfold, a peripheral region of
south-eastern Norway, this chapter describes digital entrepreneurship in the
sharing economy as an alternative to traditional accommodation services and
link its growth to regional employment and unemployment. Furthermore,
the analysis indicates that the growth of these digital entrepreneurs in the
region is driven by opportunity rather than necessity.
Chapter 6 looks into how the sharing economy has found its way into the
offshore logistics operations in the ice-infested waters of the Barents Sea. This
chapter shows how the sharing economy principles enable a number of
value-creating activities in offshore logistics and create a shared value of col-
laborative resource utilization for local industries. It is further shown that
some sharing economy principles can have trade-offs for allocation of trans-
port resources in an optimal way to be able to respond quickly to any
possible emergencies in hostile environments like the Arctic region.
Abbas Strømmen-Bakhtiar and Evgueni Vinogradov
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1 Digital platforms at work
Champagne or cocktail of risks?
Anna Ilsøe and Trine Pernille Larsen
Introduction
Digital platforms such as Uber and Airbnb that facilitate the purchase and sale
of services are an emerging phenomenon across the Western world and allow
citizens to accrue income online. Since 2010, their effect on Western econ-
omies has attracted increasing academic and political attention (Collier et al.
2017). The debates emphasise, among other things, the implications of digital
platforms for an individual’s wage and working conditions (Wood et al.
2019) and national industrial relations (IR) models (Degryse 2017). Digital
platforms are argued to change the employment relationship (De Groen and
Maselli 2016), ease circumvention of labour standards (Goods et al. 2019),
lead to unfair competition (Söderqvist 2017) and contribute to increased
inequality (Schor 2016). Less researched are the potential linkages between
distinct types of digital platform services and the levels of labour precarious-
ness across and within Western economies.
This paper offers a novel perspective on the scope of digital platform
economies and the dynamics between the institutional framework and the
individual’s exposure to precariousness when active on distinct digital plat-
forms, even in densely regulated labour markets like Denmark. Denmark is
well known for its universal welfare protection and strong IR-institutions
that seemingly cushion individual’s risks of in-work poverty, earnings
inequalities and high job insecurities (Campbell and Price 2016). Thus,
Denmark represents a critical case for examining the interlinkages between
digital platforms and risks of precariousness, as institutions are in place to
balance out potential labour market inequalities.
Our main research questions are: what is the scope of the digital platform
economy; are distinct digital platforms associated with different levels of pre-
cariousness; and, if so, why. Our focal point is the individual’s income gener-
ated via digital platforms and to what extent the low levels of protection on
platforms are buffered by the wider institutional setting. The latter is defined
here as employment and social protection provided to the individual through,
for example, other jobs, the IR-system and the welfare state in terms of col-
lectively agreed wages, statutory social assistance and unemployment benefits.
To address these questions, we draw on the first large-scale randomised
survey on digital platforms in Denmark. Theoretically, we have sought
inspiration from Thelen and Weidemann (2018). We infer that, although
digital platforms have become more widespread, they are not necessarily
accompanied by rising levels of precariousness, even if such online activities
often operate outside the framework of most countries’ labour laws and col-
lective agreements. We argue that the risks of precariousness depend on
how the wider institutional framework for social and employment protec-
tion, in combination with the individual, are able to mitigate the risks of
operating in a non-regulated online market. In this context, we distinguish
between two types of digital platforms: labour platforms, defined as digital
intermediaries providing purchase and sale of typically labour-intensive ser-
vices such as Uber; and capital platforms, which facilitate and provide rental
of private property like Airbnb.
These two types of digital platforms are both expected to be associated
with risks of precariousness, but at different levels due to the combined effects
of a weak regulatory framework offering low levels of social protection and
the differing characteristics of individuals accruing income from capital and
labour platforms (Grimshaw et al. 2016; Rubery et al. 2018; Wood et al.
2019). Access to capital platforms is typically related to private ownership,
whilst other dynamics like educational attainments and skill levels are assumed
to apply to labour platforms (Healy et al. 2017). These differences are
expected to influence individuals’ exposure to precariousness, especially as
their individual characteristics indicate their ability to compensate for the low
levels of social and employment protection dominating capital and labour
platforms.
This article is divided into five sections. First, we briefly discuss distinct
forms of digital platforms. We then develop an analytical framework by
reviewing the literature on digital labour, atypical and precarious employ-
ment. After this, the methods and data set used are presented, followed by
our analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings.
Introducing the concepts of capital and labour platforms
There have been many concepts at play with regard to digital platforms. The
European Commission (2016) has used the concept ‘collaborative economy’,
whereas Danish unions prefer the concept of the ‘platform economy’ (LO
2016). A widely used concept is the ‘sharing economy’, which is often used
in relation to distinct types of platforms where sharing, including exchange,
rotation and fundraising take place (Schor 2016).
There is ample research that utilises various categories of digital platforms
to capture the plethora of activities involved (Howcroft and Bregvall-
Kåreborn 2019: 25). Such categories often include both narrow and wide
definitions of digital platforms. Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) operate with one
of the widest definitions, including paid and unpaid virtual work as well as
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users, providers and founders of digital platforms. We use a rather narrow
definition and focus solely on the providers, i.e., those who accrue income
through the digital platforms. We thereby omit the customers and founders,
mainly because our aim is to gain insights into whether distinct digital plat-
forms entail different exposure to risks of precariousness. Furthermore, we
distinguish between two main types of digital platforms, while recognising
that other studies operate with different categories and classifications.
The two main types of digital platforms used here are: 1) capital platforms
that facilitate rentals of private property or belongings like Airbnb; and 2)
labour platforms that facilitate the purchase and sale of typically labour intensive
services like Uber (Farrell and Greig 2016; Schor and Attwood-Charles
2017). Other research also uses such categorisations, but tend to use them to
illuminate common features associated with online activities rather than to
explore the potential linkages between distinct platforms and the levels of
precariousness, which is our paper’s empirical focus (Howcroft and Bregvall-
Kåreborn 2019: 25). The more specific characteristics of Danish labour and
capital platforms are described in the analysis since the specifics of platforms
typically vary depending on the national context including the regulations
applicable to distinct platforms.
One of the challenges when investigating the size of income generated via
digital platforms is to decide, which types of websites and apps fall within and
outside these categories. With regard to labour platforms, we include platforms
that facilitate work tasks – either as gigs (small tasks in the physical world) or as
crowd work (small tasks done on the computer) (De Stefano 2016; Schmidt
2017). We have adopted a relatively narrow definition of capital platforms,
which omits websites that facilitate buying and selling of used goods in our
study. We are aware that this definition may result in our figures being more
conservative compared to other studies like Farrell and Greig (2016). The
reason for this choice is that we want to uncover whether and, if so how, digi-
tal platforms contribute to securing an ongoing income for individuals rather
than an occasional sale of used belongings.
Digital platforms and risks of precariousness
Digital platforms are often considered to be yet another form of non-standard
employment that exerts a downward pressure on wages, entails unfair compe-
tition and increases the risks of precarious employment in terms of poor job
quality, lack of voice and high employment insecurities (Berg 2016; Goods
et al. 2019). Such studies rarely distinguish between different digital platforms
and their levels of precariousness and thus face similar criticism to much of
the literature on atypical work. The latter research often overlooks the fact
that a full-time permanent position is no guarantee against precariousness,
whilst atypical work does not necessarily equal precariousness (Keune and
Pedaci 2019: 2). However, strong links appear to exist between atypical work
and precarious employment, although the risks of precariousness typically
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assume a different shape depending on the type of non-standard employment,
where the welfare settlement and national IR-systems seem to play a part in
cushioning the associated risks of precariousness (Campbell and Price 2016).
The dynamics between the institutional framework and the individual’s expos-
ure to precariousness when active on distinct digital platforms are less researched
than other forms of non-standard employment (Schor and Attwood-Charles
2017). To encounter these shortcomings, we have sought inspiration from other
streams of research on precarious and non-standard employment. Such studies
typically emphasise different mechanisms fostering the recent rise in precarious
employment (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Doellgast et al. 2018). They point, for
example, to the changing landscape of industrial relations, with declining union
densities, shrinking collective agreement coverage along with welfare retrench-
ment and labour market reforms that increasingly tie social benefits to employ-
ment status and collective agreements (Palier and Thelen 2010; Kalleberg and
Vallas 2018: 5). The implications of these developments are argued to be a shift
from collective mitigated risks by means of welfare and IR-settlements, towards
increased individualised risks due to eroding employment and social protection
(Kalleberg and Vallas 2018: 5). The regulatory setting with regard to digital plat-
forms – especially labour platforms – is assumed to only fuel this development
since digital platforms often redefine the traditional notion of employers and
workers and facilitate solo self-employment. Thus, platforms abrogate the trad-
itional employer responsibility of shouldering the costs of employee protection
with resultant increased individualised risks of precariousness (Palier 2018). Much
welfare and IR-literature stresses the pivotal role of the established system in
striking new balances between flexibility and security to mitigate the gaps in pro-
tection emerging within the IR-settings and welfare arrangements following the
growth in atypical work, including digital platforms (Grimshaw et al. 2016). To
explore the scope of digital platforms and the potential linkages between distinct
digital platforms and precariousness, we have sought inspiration from the work
by Thelen (2019), Thelen and Weidemann (2018), although we only draw on
selected aspects of their concepts. We choose this literature due to their notion
that both the institutional framework for employment and social protection in
combination with individual characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, educa-
tional attainment and employment prove critical to counteract or multiply pre-
cariousness. This will allow us to ascertain whether some digital platforms
involve greater risks of precariousness than others, and how the institutional
framework for social and employment protection in combination with the indi-
vidual are able to mitigate the risks of operating in a less-regulated digital market.
Collective and individual risk protection
Thelen and Weidemann (2018) operate with two dimensions of risk – col-
lective and individualised risk protection – and argue that they are pivotal to
individuals’ exposure to precariousness. Collective risk protection is concerned
with how and to what degree established welfare and labour market institutions
4 Anna Ilsøe and Trine Pernille Larsen
provide a safety net to mitigate risks of precariousness through social and
employment protection. Here, we only consider employment and social pro-
tection provided by the IR-system and welfare state in terms of collective
agreed minimum wages, statutory unemployment benefits and social assistance,
while recognising that other forms of social protection like private insurances,
health care etc., also buffer individuals from the low protection offered on digi-
tal platforms. Individualised risk protection is concerned with the individual’s own
resources and thus their ability to limit their risk exposure by securing other
viable means of funding such as holding other jobs and having savings. The
individual’s characteristics such as age, ethnicity, gender, educational attain-
ments and employment records prove pivotal to securing alternative avenues
against precariousness (ibid.). Although collective and individualised risk protec-
tion are independent arrangements with different origins, they mutually
reinforce one another by, in some instances, limiting or increasing individuals’
exposure to precariousness depending on the institutional framework and
the individual’s characteristics. High levels of collective risk protection can
compensate low levels of individualised risk protection and vice versa.
However, the combined effects of low levels of collective and individualised
risk protection may also increase risks of precariousness (ibid.). Therefore,
risks of precariousness are expected to assume different forms across distinct
types of non-standard employment, countries and institutional settings.
Applying the concepts of individualised and collective risk protection to our
notion of two distinct digital platforms (i.e. labour and capital platforms), we
expect that the activities taking place via these platforms will be associated with
different levels of precariousness. Both the regulation of capital and labour plat-
forms, including wage-setting and working conditions, is often left to market
forces, since the traditional safety net of labour laws and collective agreements
is limited, if not non-existent (Aleksynska et al. 2018). Therefore, digital plat-
forms typically offer low levels of collective risk protection, leaving employ-
ment and social protection to be shouldered by the individual or the wider
regulatory framework for social protection (Schor and Attwood-Charles 2017).
We expect that the characteristics of individuals active on capital and labour
platforms, and thus their level of individual risk protection, will differ, since
distinct dynamics apply depending on the particular exchange of services.
Labour platforms entail that individuals in their capacity as labourers will
accrue income by providing and selling their skills and services via the plat-
form through various assignments. The possibility of offering small amounts
of services in a highly flexible online setting may allow for new income
opportunities for individuals with restricted working capabilities, or struggling
entering the traditional job market (Healy et al. 2017). Therefore, we expect
that low-skilled workers, women, migrants and young people will be overre-
presented on labour platforms since studies on atypical work finds that these
groups are particularly at risk of precariousness (Rubery et al. 2018). Such
groups often work on the edges of the labour market or in less regulated sec-
tors, where atypical work also tends to be widespread (Grimshaw et al. 2016).
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Capital platforms operate in a different way, where income arises from com-
modifying private property exchanges by leasing private cars, houses or apart-
ments via the platform. Thus, access to capital platforms seems implicitly
conditioned by individuals’ holding properties – rentals or acquired private
property – to lease via the platform. The ability to acquire and then lease pri-
vate property requires a relatively secure source of income gained through
stable employment or by other viable means. Therefore, individuals active on
capital platforms may hold stronger positions within the traditional labour
market than their peers on labour platforms, where low entry barriers may ease
integration of marginalised groups into the labour market (Healy et al. 2017).
The assumed differences in the characteristics of individuals active on cap-
ital and labour platforms are expected to influence their exposure to precar-
iousness. We posit that low levels of precariousness will be found on capital
platforms: individuals engaged in such online activities will, in their capacity
as property owners and/or (often) secure employees in the traditional labour
market, have other means to compensate for the weak regulatory framework
characterizing capital platforms. Their high level of individual risk protection
is expected to shelter them against the online risks of precariousness. The
wider institutional framework for employment and social protection may also
add another layer of protection, particularly if the capital platform providers
combine their online activities with jobs in the traditional labour market. In
such instances, online income is mainly a top-up for existing income sources
and can be considered a pleasant, but unnecessary luxury like champagne.
The situation is expected to be somewhat different on labour platforms,
where risks of precariousness are assumed to be more common due to the
combined effects of the individual characteristics of platform workers and the
weak regulatory framework for wage and working conditions. Their low
levels of individual risk protection may only increase their risks of precarious-
ness, especially if the wider regulatory setting for employment and social pro-
tection also fails to compensate for the gaps in protection on digital platforms.
Therefore, labour platforms may involve a cocktail of risks, whilst the impli-
cations seem less severe on capital platforms due to individual’s ability to
compensate for the lack of social protection characterizing platforms through
other viable means.
The developed analytical framework is used to study the scope of digital
platforms and individuals’ exposure to precariousness on distinct platforms.
Such an analysis may also contribute to the further development of the
models by Thelen and Weidemann (2018) into analytical tools when applying
those models to forms of non-standard employment other than those for
which their models were initially developed.
Methods and used data
To examine the scope of digital platforms, including the potential ties
between distinct online activities and individuals’ risks of precariousness, we
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draw on a large-scale survey involving 18,000 randomly selected Danish citi-
zens aged 15–74 years, conducted as part of the Danish Labour Force Survey
2017. We thereby offer a novel cross-sectoral platform perspective in an
emerging field, where most research either tends to focus on certain sectors
or single case studies (Howcroft and Bregvall-Kåreborn 2019).
The Danish Labour Force Survey is conducted quarterly by Statistics
Denmark and is based on a random sample of the population,1 who are
interviewed, using a combination of web survey and phone interviews.
The quality and size of the Danish Labour Force Survey gives us access to
solid figures on the scope of digital platforms, which are a growing, but
still limited, phenomenon. The standard survey also includes many relevant
questions on demographics to which we added three questions on digital
platforms. We asked the respondents, if they had accrued income by per-
forming tasks found via digital platforms during the last 12 months. We
also asked, if they had had income by leasing their property via digital
platforms during the past 12 months. The third question addressed the
level of income generated via digital platforms. Prior to data collection, we
conducted a pilot test and adjusted the wording of the questions. The
survey was conducted during the first quarter of 2017 and received
responses from 18,043 Danes, corresponding to a response rate of
54 percent.
The data generated as part of the Danish Labour Force Survey was used
to examine the potential linkages between distinct types of digital plat-
forms and risks of precariousness, using descriptive statistics and regression
analysis. We used the following dependent and independent variables in
our analysis.
• Dependent variables: income via labour platforms, income via capital plat-
forms, total income from platforms.
• Independent variables2: gender, age, ethnicity, education, employment
status, total income of employed citizens.
Our analytical strategy was twofold: Firstly, we examined how digital plat-
forms are regulated in Denmark (based on desk research) and mapped the
share of Danes with incomes from the two types of digital platforms, along
with the related income levels from such sources (descriptive statistics). Sec-
ondly, we examined the profile of platform providers (their labour market
status, demographic characteristics) and thus sought to answer our main
research question of whether distinct digital platforms involve greater risks of
precariousness than others (regression analysis). The latter analysis includes
two binary regressions (using linear probability models): one examining the
correlation between an individual’s likelihood of accruing income via
a labour platform and their individual characteristics; and a second regression
analysis on the characteristics of people who have accrued income via
a capital platform.
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Analysis
Digital platforms and the Danish labour market
The first digital platforms arrived in Denmark in the 2000s. The first capital
platform was a Danish-owned car-pooling service (GoMore), which was
launched in 2005 and later developed into a site for private car rentals.
Labour platforms came a few years after the first capital platforms. Uber
launched its Uber Pop service in Denmark in 2014, but ceased their services
again in April 2017. Throughout 2015 and 2016 different Danish-owned
labour platforms emerged, especially within the field of cleaning (for
instance Happy Helper and Hilfr). There has been considerable debate in
the media and among Danish politicians and social partners, as to how to
perceive and regulate digital platforms. Recent court rulings have contrib-
uted to clarifying matters.
Capital platforms are by definition not part of the labour market, as
income from rentals through platforms is considered to be a capital return
according to Danish law (Ilsøe and Madsen 2018). Nevertheless, income
via capital platforms may still affect individual’s behaviour, not least regard-
ing risks of precariousness since activity on a capital platform, in principle,
is related to private ownership. Debates on capital platforms have centered
on the lack of tax payments on income accrued via the platforms, and
Danish tax authorities, among others, have produced a number of guide-
lines on how to correctly report private income via capital platforms.3 In
Spring 2018, the Danish government signed an agreement with Airbnb
that granted higher thresholds for tax-free income via the platform on con-
dition that all income accrued via the Airbnb platform is automatically
reported to the Danish tax authorities. However, the agreement has not
been implemented yet.
Labour platforms are considered as part of the Danish labour market. There-
fore, income generated via labour platforms is subject to income taxation.
Labour platforms typically operate by allowing larger or smaller bids of par-
ticular tasks to be performed by individuals who are not employed by the
platform, and thus not considered to be workers or employees. Instead, they
are perceived as self-employed or independent contractors that provide ser-
vices facilitated through and by the platform. Individuals active on labour
platforms are legally obliged to register with the Danish VAT register and pay
VAT, if their income via the platforms reaches a certain threshold
(€6,666 per year).
Both capital and labour platforms operate in a less-regulated online setting,
where market forces regulate pricing and working conditions (Ilsøe and
Madsen 2017). The notion of individuals selling their services via digital plat-
forms being self-employed leaves them with limited, if any coverage from
Danish collective agreements and labour laws. However, Danish social part-
ners have, with varying success, attempted to cover individuals on platforms,
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especially those operating on the labour platforms.4 Nonetheless, most indi-
viduals engaged in online activities operate outside the range of the Danish
IR-model. This leaves most platform workers in a protective gap with lower
levels of collective risk protection than employees covered by collective
agreements or Danish labour laws (Ilsøe and Madsen 2018). They often share
these conditions with other forms of non-standard workers on the Danish
labour market (freelancers, temporary employed and marginal part-timers
etc.), who also tend to have less coverage from Danish laws and collective
agreements (Larsen 2011; Scheuer 2017).
The Danish labour market is characterised by wage and working condi-
tions being primarily regulated through collective agreements signed by
social partners at sectoral and company levels (Larsen et al. 2010). Legislation
plays a more limited role – primarily in areas like gender equality, health
and safety, holiday entitlements, vocational and further training (Due and
Madsen 2008). This institutional set-up cushions, to some extent, the effects
of the unregulated digital platforms. An example of how the Danish IR-
model limits the effects is the collective agreed wages’ positive knock-on
effects on wage-setting in the unorganised parts of the labour market,
including digital labour platforms (Larsen 2011). Digital cleaning platforms
like Happy Helper5 and Hilfr6 offer an hourly price ranging from €15.70 to
€16.60 to their service suppliers, which nearly resembles the minimum col-
lective agreed wage (€17) within the Danish cleaning sector (DI 2017).
However, while such platform workers may receive nearly the same min-
imum hourly payment as their peers covered by collective agreements, their
hourly payment is considerably lower than the average hourly wages
(€22.30) within the cleaning sector due to their limited access to wage sup-
plements (Ilsøe et al. 2017). Furthermore, with the exception of Hilfr, they
also have no rights to other collectively agreed benefits like pensions, further
training, paid sick leave or maternity leave and are thus expected to shoulder
such costs individually without being compensated through higher hourly
payments (Ilsøe and Madsen 2018). Therefore, the Danish IR-model appears
unable to compensate for most protection gaps on digital platforms, leaving
it to the Danish welfare state or individuals themselves to provide a safety
net when active in the digital labour market.
The Danish welfare state provides, with its universal citizenship-based wel-
fare services, limited usage of means-testing and employment-related benefits –
a safety net for those operating on the edges of the labour market (Esping-
Andersen 1999). However, shifting Danish governments have gradually tied
social protection to employment status and collective agreement coverage
(Larsen and Mailand 2018). This adds to the pressure on platform workers
with regard to social protection: they often struggle to meet the tighter eligi-
bility criteria for unemployment benefit and social assistance. They thus
experience lower levels of collective risk protection as most welfare institu-
tions are founded on the assumption of employees’ holding permanent full-
time positions or working full time on a self-employed basis. On the other
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hand, the Danish social assistance and unemployment benefit schemes may
prevent a race to the bottom on the platforms: they implicitly provide a wage
floor, which is difficult for the platforms to ignore, if they want to attract
individuals to sell their services. The lowest level of monthly unemployment
benefits range from €1,665 for part-time insured workers to €2,457 for full-
time insured workers. Moreover, monthly levels of social assistance range
from €972 to €2,000 depending on age and provider roles (Mailand and
Larsen 2018). Therefore, Danish social protection may also limit a downward
spiral on wage and working conditions on digital platforms.
Digital platforms, their scope and size of generated income
The digital platforms operating in Denmark involve only a small fraction of
the workforce. Our survey results indicate that 2.4 percent of Danes had pur-
chased and sold services via either a digital labour or a capital platform during
the last year. Around 1.4 percent – had accumulated income by leasing their
private properties via a capital platform, whilst 1 percent of Danes reported
income arising from labour platforms. Thus, Danes seem more likely to use
capital platforms than labour platforms to top up their income (Table 1.1).
These results are in line with a number British and American quantitative
studies (Farrell and Greig 2016; Katz and Krueger 2016; Rubery et al. 2018)
Activity on one type of platform is rarely related to activity on other types of
platforms. Less than 0.1 percent have been active on both types of platforms
within the last year. Therefore, most individuals involved in such online activ-
ities often generate income exclusively from capital platforms (1.4 percent of
Danes) or labour platforms (0.9 percent of Danes), respectively (Table 1.1).
The level of income accrued via digital platforms is relatively modest on
both labour and capital digital platforms. For example, 61 percent of Danes
generating income via a labour platform within the last 12 months had
earned less than €3,330 annually before taxes whilst 71 percent of Danes pro-
viding services via a capital platform had generated less than €3,330 annually
before taxes within the last year (Table 1.2).
Table 1.1 The share of Danes aged 15–74 accruing income via digital capital and/or labour
platforms during the past 12 months in percent
Accrued income
solely via labour
platform
Accrued income
solely via a capital
platform
Accrued income via
both capital and
labour platforms
Total share of population
accruing income from capital
or labour platforms
Yes 0.9 1.4 0,1* 2.4
No 99.1 98.6 99.9 97.6
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: authors’ own calculations based on weighted data, * unreliable estimate due to small N.
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The modest level of income generated via a capital and/or labour platform
indicates potential risks of precariousness. Furthermore, the division between
individuals active on labour platforms and capital platforms calls for further
investigation – especially with regard to their demographics, labour market
status and educational attainment as these factors are assumed to influence
such individuals’ level of risk protection and thus exposure to precariousness
(Rubery 2015).
Labour platforms and individuals’ exposure to risk of precariousness
Less than 1 percent of Danes have sold services via a labour platform, and few of
these – 12 percent – generated more than €3,330 within the last year. A large
minority group – 28 percent – were unable to report on their annual income gen-
erated via a labour platform (Table 1.2). This indicates that unless such platform
workers combine their income via the labour platform with other income sources,
they face increased risks of precariousness, particularly considering the Danish
living costs. In this context, our regression results demonstrate that labour market
status and a number of demographic variables correspond closely with whether or
not individuals offer and sell their services via a labour platform (Table 1.3).
Labour market status appears to influence the activity levels on labour plat-
forms. Unemployed workers seem more likely than others to generate income
via a labour platform, followed by retirees, students and other people outside the
labour force.7 In fact, employed people are less likely than others to do so (Table
1.3). When looking at employed citizens active on the platforms, we find an
over representation of those with lower earnings. Thirty-two per cent of these
are located in the two lowest income deciles of adult Danes. Further analyses also
indicate a close link between employment contracts, earnings and activity levels
on labour platforms. Fixed-term and temporary agency workers are more active
on labour platforms than employees with other employment contracts. Likewise,
we find an overrepresentation of employees with low tenure (less than three
years) on the labour platforms. These results suggest that labour platforms, in line
Table 1.2 How much money have you accrued via websites or apps over the past
12 months – before taxes? (In percent of all who reported an income via
a labour of capital platform, respectively)
Labour platforms Capital platforms
Less than DKK 25.000 (€3.330) 61 71
DKK 25.000 (€ 3.330) or more 12 19
Don’t know 28 9*
Total 100 100
Source: authors’ own calculations based on a weighted data, * unreliable estimate due to
small N.
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Table 1.3 Linear probability regression model: probability of income on capital and labour
forms depending individual characteristics
Labour platforms Capital platforms
Base model Full-model Base model Full-model
Male (ref) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Female –0.04*** –0.08*** 0.02*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
15–19 years (ref) 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
20–29 years –0.29*** 0.33***
(0.01) (0.01)
30–39 years –0.40*** 0.43***
(0.01) (0.01)
40–49 years –0.28*** 0.34***
(0.01) (0.01)
50–59 years –0.51*** 0.50***
(0.01) (0.01)
60–74 years –0.64*** 0.65***
(0.01) (0.01)
Danish (ref) 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Other ethnic
backgrounds
0.10*** –0.10***
(0.00) (0.00)
Primary education
(ref)
0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Upper secondary &
vocational training
0.17*** –0.16***
(0.01) (0.00)
Higher education
(short)
–0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
BA –0.02*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
MA & PhD –0.09*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01)
(Continued )
with our expectations, especially attract groups with low individual risk protec-
tion in that they are more likely to be at the margins of the Danish labour
market. Such groups rarely have alternative resources at their disposal to limit
their exposure to precariousness and are thus unable to compensate for the weak
regulatory framework characterising labour platforms. Their low levels of indi-
vidual risk protection seem even more apparent when controlling for other fac-
tors such as age, gender, ethnicity and educational attainment (Table 1.3).
Activities on labour platforms seem to be age related: young people aged
15–19 years are more likely to offer and sell services via a labour platform
than their older peers. However, the effect of age diminishes somewhat when
controlling for other factors (Table 1.3). Our regression results also indicate
that men are more likely than women to accrue income via labour platforms.
The same applies to low-skilled workers, whilst those with higher education
(short, BA or MA/PhD) are least likely to do so. Moreover, people with
ethnic backgrounds other than Danish are more likely to be active on labour
platforms (Table 1.3). These findings contribute to a picture where many
platform workers seem to have limited individual means to counteract their
exposure to low income on digital platforms and thus risks of precariousness:
they are more likely to be low skilled with scarce financial resources. In fact,
the combined effects of their individual characteristics seem to reflect
Table 1.3 (Cont.)
Labour platforms Capital platforms
Base model Full-model Base model Full-model
Employed (ref) 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Unemployed 0.26*** –0.24***
(0.01) (0.01)
Retirees etc. 0.17*** –0.16***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.28***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
N (weighted data) 97,787 97,787 97,787
r2 0.19 0.00 0.19
Linear probability model
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
***p < 0.001
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a cocktail of risks, where the wider institutional framework offer some col-
lective risk protection. Many platform workers in their capacity as
unemployed workers, retirees, students or social assistance claimants receive
unemployment benefits, student allowances or social assistance, which they
often appear to combine with income accrued via labour platforms. Thereby,
Danish social protection schemes seem to compensate for the low levels of
individual risk protection and weak regulatory framework dominating Danish
labour platforms.
Capital platforms and individuals’ exposure to risk of precariousness
Around 1.4 percent of Danes had generated income via a capital platform within
the last year and, among those, 71 percent had earned less than DKK 25,000
(€3,330) while 19 percent reported higher financial returns from the capital plat-
form. Around 10 percent were unable to report on their annual income gener-
ated via a capital platform (Table 1.2). The reported income levels via capital
platforms appear modest and thus capital platforms seem to entail similar expos-
ure to risks of precariousness as the labour platforms insofar as the individuals
active on capital platforms are unable to top up their income via the capital plat-
form with other sources of income. Our regression analysis of who accumulates
income via capital platforms demonstrates a close interaction with labour market
status and demographic characteristics, although with very different results com-
pared to the individuals active on labour platforms (Table 1.3).
Among capital platform providers, the oldest segments (50–59 years, 60–74
years) are most likely to generate income via capital platforms, whereas
youngest people aged 15–19 years are least likely to lease their properties via
a capital platform. Focusing on labour market status, employed people are
most likely to accumulate income via a capital platform. Retirees, students
and other people outside the labour force come in second, whereas
unemployed people are least active on capital platforms when measured in
terms of financial returns. It seems that individuals active on capital platforms
often have an older age profile than their peers on labour platforms as well as
they are more often employed. Further analysis indicates that they often hold
open-ended contracts. This is perhaps not surprising, as many tend to settle
in the labour market with a stable or increasing income, as they grow older.
Such stability allows people to purchase their own home, car, and other
belongings, which they afterwards can lease via capital platforms. Combining
our analysis with income data, we find that 30 percent of employed providers
of services on capital platforms have a total income in the top two income
deciles of the Danish adult population. Thus, Danes with a higher total
income seem overrepresented on capital platforms, whilst we saw the oppos-
ite among individuals active on labour platforms.
Such results imply, in line with our expectations, that capital platforms
attract very different groups from labour platforms in that the former is more
likely than the latter to have a stronger foothold in the traditional labour
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market and to have other means of income at their disposal. They thus have
higher levels of individual risk protection that shelter them against the
unregulated online market and its associated risks. The high levels of individ-
ual risk protection among individuals active on capital platforms are further
underlined when controlling for other factors such as gender, ethnicity and
educational attainment (Table 1.3).
In contrast to the labour platforms, women are more likely than men to
accumulate income via capital platforms. Education and ethnicity also play
a role, but in a different way from the patterns found among providers on
labour platforms: people with higher education (BA or MA/PhD) are more
likely to generate income via capital platforms compared to their peers with
lower levels of educational attainments. Moreover, and in sharp contrast to
our findings regarding individuals on labour platforms, we also find that
ethnic Danes are overrepresented on capital platforms (Table 1.3).
These results imply, in line with our expectations, that the combined
effects of the individual characteristics of people active on capital platforms
reduce their exposure to precariousness in that their high-skill levels, com-
bined with stable employment and substantial savings, provide them with
a safety net that compensates for the gaps in protection dominating the online
market. The Danish welfare state and IR-model seem to only strengthen or
multiply their risk protection since they add another layer of social and
employment protection for most individuals, especially those that combine
their online activities with jobs in the organised labour market. This also indi-
cates that risks of precariousness seem less common on capital platforms, but
only because individuals, in combination with the social protection offered by
the wider institutional framework, are able to compensate for the weak regu-
latory framework of capital platforms. Therefore, online income resembles
a pleasant, but unnecessary luxury, like champagne.
Discussion and conclusion
Citizens of the Western world increasingly seek supplementary income
online – either by leasing their property or by taking on extra assignments via
a digital platform. This has given rise to academic and political debates on
how to conceptualise and regulate such online activities, including their
implications for an individual’s exposure to precariousness when active on
distinct platforms like labour and capital platforms. Three main aspects are
emphasised in the discussion of our findings.
Firstly, our analysis demonstrates that income accrued via digital platforms
is rather modest in Denmark with 2.4 percent of Danes providing and selling
their services via online apps or websites. In most cases such sources of online
income represent a supplement rather than the main source of income for
individuals active on digital platforms, findings that echo other European and
American studies (Katz and Krueger 2016; Rubery et al. 2018). However,
among the 2.4 percent of individuals actively providing and selling services
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via a digital platform, marked differences can be traced between those active
on a labour platform and their peers on capital platforms. It is rarely the
same people selling their labour and renting out their private properties via
digital platforms. Less than 0.1 percent of Danes have been active on both
types of platforms within the last year and further analyses indicate, in line
with our expectations, that the characteristics of the individuals active on
labour platforms and capital platforms differ considerably when comparing
their demographics, labour market status, level of educational attainment
and overall income levels. In fact, certain groups such as young people,
low-skilled, low paid and unemployed people, temporary employees and
non-ethnic Danish were more likely to accrue income via labour platforms;
whilst their older and often higher educated and more well-off peers with
stronger labour market ties (they were employed) tended to be overrepre-
sented among capital platform providers. Our results echo other American
and European studies, which also suggest that it is rarely the same people
selling their labour and leasing their private properties/possessions via web-
sites and apps (Farrell and Greig 2016; Katz and Krueger 2016). The fact
that labour platforms seem to attract low-skilled workers, young people,
unemployed and low-income groups points to their limited means to pur-
chase private property which can then be leased via a capital platform. This
also seems to explain the limited overlap between individuals accruing
income via digital labour and capital platforms as well as their level of
exposure to precariousness when active online.
Secondly, our findings support our notion that capital and labour plat-
forms are associated with different levels of precariousness, even if both
platforms represent less or non-regulated online settings. The differences in
the characteristics of individuals accruing income via labour and capital
platforms put individuals on labour platforms at greater risks of precarious-
ness than their peers on capital platforms due to their lower levels of indi-
vidual risk protection. Therefore, individuals renting their properties via
capital platforms seem in a better position than individuals on labour plat-
forms to mitigate the effects arising from the weak regulatory framework
and thus to limit their exposure to precariousness. Their higher skill levels
combined with stable employment and substantial savings provide them
with a safety net that compensates for the gaps in protection dominating
the online market. The Danish welfare state and IR-model seem to
strengthen capital platform providers’ risk protection since the wider insti-
tutional framework adds another layer of social and employment protec-
tion especially for those that combine their online activities with jobs in
the organised labour market. The situation is somewhat different for most
groups active on labour platforms, even if the Danish welfare state and
IR-model also – to some extent – shoulder their risks of low levels of
social protection on the labour platforms. In fact, labour platforms appear
to especially attract groups that seek to gain a foothold in the Danish
labour market. Unemployed people and young people at the start of their
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career are more likely to generate income via labour platforms than other
platform providers. Likewise, non-ethnic Danes were overrepresented –
a group that generally find it difficult entering the Danish labour market
(Ejrnæs 2006). This indicates – in line with our expectations – that labour
platforms, on the one hand, may contribute to increased risks of precar-
iousness due to the combined effects of a rather unregulated setting and
individuals with low levels of individual risk protection. However, on the
other hand, labour platforms may also foster labour market inclusion for
groups often struggling to gain employment.
Thirdly, with regard to the wider institutional framework and its pivotal
role in mitigating the effects of low levels of social and employment protec-
tion on digital platforms, the Danish welfare state and IR-model seem to
make a difference, but in distinct ways. Our analysis points to the fact that
people using capital platforms are of less risk of precariousness than those
using labour platforms. The recent government led reforms that tighten the
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits and social assistance seem to
place additional pressure on some digital platform providers (Mailand and
Larsen 2018). Their low income generated via digital platforms suggest few
contracted hours and especially those with no other jobs may struggle to
qualify for unemployment benefits and social assistance as these schemes are
earnings-related or depend on past employment records, including the
number of hours worked while in employment (Larsen and Mailand 2018).
Therefore, the established institutional framework seems in some instances to
contribute to the cocktail of risks for some digital platform providers, espe-
cially those selling their services via labour platforms. The policy implications
thus far have been a reform that implicitly eases platform workers access to
unemployment benefits by allowing all types of income and not just waged-
work to account towards individuals accrued rights. Likewise, some social
partners have started to negotiate collective agreements covering especially
labour platforms to strengthen such individual’s safety net when operating
online (Ilsøe and Madsen 2018). However, further configurations of existing
welfare and IR-arrangements seem to be needed to cover the protective gaps,
where relaxed eligibility criteria in terms of lowering the threshold for past
employment records and number of hours worked may be a way forward to
cushion the risks of precariousness, especially among those working for low
income on labour platforms.
On the other hand, our findings suggest that the Danish social assistance and
unemployment benefit schemes along with the knock-on effects of the collect-
ively agreed wages on the unregulated labour market may also limit downward
pressures on price setting on the digital platforms. They implicitly provide an
informal wage floor, which is difficult for the platforms to ignore if they want
to attract individuals to sell their services via the platform. Therefore, the
established Danish welfare and IR-systems seemingly and to some extent pre-
vent employers from utilising labour platforms to circumvent the existing
labour market system to curb labour costs, as much of digital platform literature
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argues and seen with the recent rise of other forms of atypical employment in
several countries (Rubery 2015; Berg 2016; Kalleberg and Vallas 2018).
Our findings support this notion, as most individuals active on labour plat-
forms complement their scarce income generated via the platform with
unemployment benefits, social assistance, or other welfare-regulated social
benefits. Optimists would argue that platforms foster labour market inclu-
sion and that we have only seen the beginning of this potential – platform
services will grow and contribute to growth and employment – for mar-
ginalised as well as other groups. Pessimists, however, would look at the
risks of precariousness, especially in countries where the wider institutional
framework fails to deliver a buffer that counteracts the weak regulatory
framework characterising the digital platforms (Wood et al. 2019). Further
studies, including longitudinal data on platform providers, their employ-
ment status and income, can tell us, whether platform work over time
contributes to labour market integration or segmentation. Such studies
might also include other variables as indicators of precariousness than the
classic demographic variables used in previous studies (Kalleberg 2011;
Thelen 2019). This could be variables on health and safety issues, stress
and perceived employment insecurity (Gash et al. 2007). Our study offers
important conceptual and methodological insights and experiences that can
be of relevance for such future research. Firstly, the conceptual distinction
between labour and capital platforms is crucial as these platforms attract
very different crowds. Secondly, it is important to include both forms in
future research to investigate their various effects since not only labour
platforms, but also capital platforms may influence the structure and com-
position of the future labour market and its regulation.
Notes
1 There are always some uncertainties associated with using sample data. Statistics Den-
mark deals with selection bias in two ways. Firstly, all analyses are based on a weighted
sample, which means that the results can be said to be a representative expression of the
entire Danish population. Secondly, numbers representing fewer than 7,000 individuals
are reported as uncertain in the analysis – and numbers representing fewer than 4,000
individuals are not displayed (Statistics Denmark 2012).
2 We included these variables since most studies on precarious employment indicate that
they play a key role in determining the risks of precariousness (Kalleberg 2011; Thelen
2019). Due to a small NN, the variable ‘total income of employed citizens’ could only
be included in the descriptive statistics.
3 www.skat.dk/skat.aspx?oid=2236769.
4 In Spring 2018, the Danish union 3F (United Federation of Danish Workers) and the
cleaning platform Hilfr signed a collective agreement which, among other things, sets
a minimum wage and different labour standards.
5 Source: happyhelper.dk.
6 Source: hilfr.dk.
7 This might seem counter intuitive, but platform work is rarely registered in the trad-
itional administrative Danish registers, which means that citizens can be registered as
out of work and participate on labour platforms at the same time.
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Notes
Chapter 1
1 There are always some uncertainties associated with using sample data. Statis-
tics Denmark deals with selection bias in two ways. Firstly, all analyses are
based on a weighted sample, which means that the results can be said to be a
representative expression of the entire Danish population. Secondly, numbers
representing fewer than 7,000 individuals are reported as uncertain in the
analysis – and numbers representing fewer than 4,000 individuals are not dis-
played (Statistics Denmark 2012).
2 We included these variables since most studies on precarious employment
indicate that they play a key role in determining the risks of precariousness
(Kalleberg 2011; Thelen 2019). Due to a small NN, the variable ‘total
income of employed citizens’ could only be included in the descriptive
statistics.
3 www.skat.dk/skat.aspx?oid=2236769.
4 In Spring 2018, the Danish union 3F (United Federation of Danish Workers)
and the cleaning platform Hilfr signed a collective agreement which, among
other things, sets a minimum wage and different labour standards.
5 Source: happyhelper.dk.
6 Source: hilfr.dk.
7 This might seem counter intuitive, but platform work is rarely registered
in the traditional administrative Danish registers, which means that citizens
can be registered as out of work and participate on labour platforms at
the same time.
Chapter 3
1 https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sharing_economy.
2 For more information on the SDGs we refer readers to https://sustainablede-
velopment.un.org/sdgs.
Chapter 5
1 The beginning of the sample may not include all actual listings, but we still
observe a positive trend from October 2015 until the end of the sample.
2 According to Airdna.co, the number of active Airbnb and Homeaway rentals
have grown from 4,248 in the first quarter of 2016 to 5,066 in the beginning
in 2019, i.e., a growth of 19%.
3 Data for the number of Airbnb listings is from Airdna and data for overnight
stays is from Statistics Norway. Data for the unemployment rate in Østfold is
from the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), and is not
the same as in Figure 5.4 which only provides annual data for the unemploy-
ment rate in our sample. All of the data series are monthly.
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